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 The purpose of this thesis is not a mere comparison of the ideas of Levinas and 
Derrida. I will focus on the reading of one particular text: Levinas’s Otherwise than Being 
or Beyond Essence, which is considered the most representative of Levinas’s later 
philosophical development and in it, we find some ideas that contrast with what we found 
in his previous work, Totality and Infinity. My point is that Derrida’s questioning of some 
of the ideas that appear in Totality and Infinity in his text “Violence and Metaphysis” are 
crucial to understand the changes that Levinas introduces in his later work, Otherwise 
than Being or Beyond Essence. This discussion raises huge questions concerning the 
nature of philosophy, history, ethics or phenomenology among others. I will point out 
first how Otherwise than Being responds to the main problem that Derrida presents in 
“Violence and Metaphysics”: that Levinas uses philosophical language against 
philosophy itself, and by using the language of philosophy, he is carrying with it certain 
presuppositions that he would like to avoid. And Secondly, that Levinas’s later notion of 
the Saying launches an attack against the metaphysics of presence, as well as Derrida’s 
notion of Writing, and thus, gets both philosophers closer to each other. 
 In general, there are numerous studies about the philosophical relationship 
between Levinas and Derrida (See e.g. Bernasconi 1988, Critchley 2014, Srajek 1998). 
In most cases, those studies focus on the relationship between Derrida’s later ethical 
thinking and Levinas. The specificity of my study lies in that I am going to focus on the 
early Derrida. Plus, I am going to take the whole text “Violence and Metaphysics” and 
try to clarify it showing the main objections that Derrida is presenting against Levinas. 
Later, I am going to contrast my analysis with some of the main theses that appear in 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. And finally, I am going to defend that both 
Levinas and Derrida present an attack to the metaphysics of presence. There are other 
studies written, for example, on the basis of the idea of “the ending of metaphysics” (See 
Bernasconi 1986) or “eschatology” (See Bernasconi 1998) to mention some, but not 
taking “Violence and Metaphysics” as a whole and re-structuring it in a way that presents 
its main problems to the reader. 
 First, I will present briefly Levinas’s philosophical project as it appears in Totality 
and Infinity (Chapter 1) in order to contextualize this problem. In Chapter 2, I am going 
to present Derrida’s reading of Totality and Infinity as it appears in “Violence and 
Metaphysis” and the main philosophical questions that his reading raises. I will organize 
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this issue in 3 subchapters (look at the table of contents). In Chapter 3, I am going to focus 
on Levinas’s Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence in a way that it will be a response 
to Derrida. Finally, in Chapter 4, I will show that both the philosophers get closer to each 
other because both Levinas’s Saying and Derrida’s Writing attack the traditional 






















Contextualization of the question: Levinas Philosophical Project in 
Totality and Infinity 
 Levinas’s main concern is if morality as it has been presented to us by our 
philosophical tradition has any validity after the Holocaust and World War II: “Everyone 
will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped 
by morality” (Levinas 1979: 21). What is the question that Levinas wants to answer in 
TI1? Plainly: how can philosophy talk about ethics after the disasters of the 20th century? 
The promises of philosophical tradition about truth, progress and, enlightenment have 
failed and, this failure coincides with a crisis in metaphysics understood as ontology: a 
complete systematic effort to understand reality. Moreover, Levinas silently assumes that 
the development of occidental rationality as metaphysics leads to those disasters. 
 Here, I am going to explain firstly, what is ontology and its relation with Levinas’s 
key term “totality”. This will let me explain the most important terminology in TI (Same, 
Other and totality). Secondly, I am going to present the three ways in which Levinas 
describes violence and its link to war. Thirdly, I am going to explain the essential bound 
between Ontology and totality, on one side, and war, on the other. This will include 
Levinas’s rejection of the philosophy of Hegel. And finally, I am going to clarify the 
sense of Levinas’s ethics on the basis of what has been exposed. 
1. Ontology and Totality 
Philosophical discourse is necessarily linked to the verb “to be”. The main 
question of philosophy has been: “why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” 
(Heidegger 2000: 1). The philosopher is always interested in what things are and in what 
there is. Besides, to talk about reality is to talk about what “it is”, through philosophical 
language. Being and philosophy are inseparable. 
In philosophy the study of being is called ontology2, and it has dominated 
philosophical discourse since Plato and Aristotle. 
                                                             
1 I will abbreviate Totality and Infinity as TI and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence as OB. 




Levinas thinks that the development of ontology throughout the history of 
philosophy as the main philosophical investigation has brought with it the ambition of 
reducing the world to its knowledge and thought: the apprehension of its being. Levinas 
explains it in this way in an interview that appears in the book Ethics and Infinity: 
In the critique of totality […] there is a reference to the history of philosophy. This 
history can be interpreted as an attempt at universal synthesis, a reduction of all experience, of 
all that is reasonable, to a totality wherein consciousness embraces the world, leaves nothing other 
outside of itself, and thus become absolute thought. The consciousness of self is at the same time 
consciousness of the whole. There have been few protestations in the history of philosophy 
against this totalization. (Levinas 1985: 75-76) 
This effort to totalize everything in a huge philosophical system is understood by 
Levinas as the reduction of the “Other” to the “Same”. These are the other two main terms 
in TI. “Sameness” or “the Same” is basically the realm of subjectivity, freedom and 
consciousness. Levinas follows in this aspect the phenomenological tradition of Husserl 
and Heidegger (in Being and Time), in the sense that transcendental subjectivity in 
Husserl and, Dasein in Heidegger are, generally speaking, the ones that constitute the 
world, the ones that give sense to what there is. The world is basically a human world. I 
develop myself, constitute myself as freedom in labor, joy and economy; constituting the 
world as my world, giving sense to it. 
Levinas presents in TI a new approach to subjectivity that wants to abandon what 
he calls the egoistic subjectivity. He seems to want to differentiate his philosophical work 
from other existentialisms3 that share this same concern with Levinas: how to protect 
individuality and subjectivity against the rule of the universal or totality. Levinas uses the 
idea of “infinity” to differentiate himself from those other existentialist philosophers, 
including Heidegger (when he mentions angst before death):  
This book then does present itself as a defense of subjectivity, but it will apprehend the 
subjectivity not at the level of its purely egoist presentation against totality nor in its anguish 
before death, but as founded in the idea of infinity. (Levinas 1979: 26) 
The Other or otherness is the surplus of being which is not reducible, assimilable, 
absorbable or enclosable by subjectivity/sameness. This obviously means that the 
conceptual tools that subjectivity uses to apprehend and dominate the world are not able 
                                                             
3 By this I mean mostly Jean-Paul Sartre. Kierkegaard could be considered too. But a fair and further 
comparison between Levinas and those authors would be good enough for another investigation. 
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to grasp the Other. If the Other could be apprehensible then it would not be Other 
anymore. The otherness of the Other would be lost. The Other can never be reduced to 
my sphere of subjectivity (in Hursserlian terms). This will lead Levinas to claim that the 
only possible relationship between the Same and the Other is an asymmetrical one. 
This relationship must be asymmetrical because if it were symmetrical one could 
equally go from one side of the relationship to the other side. The Other would be easily 
apprehensible by the Same. The relationship would be defined by a third neutral concept 
that would reduce the Other to the Same. The Other could be easily determined as what 
the Same is not, a mere negation of the ego. Thus, the Other must be an infinite Other and 
not just the negative of the Same4. We can take, for example, what the social sciences do: 
reduce and explain the intersubjective experience to relations of class, gender, culture, 
and so on. 
Totality, to clarify further, would involve this neutralization that we have just 
explained. The neutral explains any possible relationship between Same and its Other on 
the basis of a discourse that constitutes a totality. A philosophical system is a totality. 
Totality in itself has no ethical connotations5. What Levinas wants to stress is just the idea 
that the Other cannot be reduced to any totality. Sameness wants to grasp the otherness 
of the Other because, according to Levinas, there is an essential metaphysical desire 
towards the Other. But the Other is characterized as infinite precisely to guarantee its 
unreachability and the asymmetry that makes possible the relationship between Same and 
Other without totality. This metaphysical desire is, thus, impossible to satisfy, to 
accomplish. 
2. Violence and War 
 The reduction of otherness to sameness is a form of violence. This is essential to 
understand Levinas’s opposition to it. To clarify it I am presenting here how Levinas 
describes violence and its link to war. 
There are three characterizations of violence in TI: 
                                                             
4 “Just the negative of the Same” would be “alterity” and not “otherness” for Levinas. 
5 We could say that we should avoid totalization as much as possible because it wants to reduce the Other. 
So, in this sense it is bad, but Levinas accepts the impossibility of avoiding totalization in his account of 
the metaphysical desire towards the Other. Subjectivity tends to totalization. Levinas is not telling us to 
eliminate it once and for all, but he is reminding us that in our totalizations we lose sight of the primordial 
relationship between Same and Other as an asymmetrical relationship. 
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1) Violence as the destruction of someone’s identity and roots: “Violence does not 
consist so much in injuring and annihilating persons as in interrupting their continuity, 
making them play roles in which they no longer recognize themselves” (Levinas 1979: 
21). This first characterization is the one that we encounter in the reduction of the Other 
to the Same. The Other is denied its own identity by being subordinated to the Same. 
Then we have 2) Violence as non-adequation: “the violence which, for a mind 
[esprit], consists in welcoming a being to which it is inadequate” (Levinas 1979: 25).  
And at this point it needs to be clarified (because then it will be relevant to comment on 
Derrida’s interpretation), that violence is only unethical when we take into account the 
destruction of one’s identity, but not necessarily because of the non-adequation. Violence 
is present in the moment of ethics. And we could take this as the third way of presenting 
violence. 
3) Violence as the sudden and unexpected encounter with the infinite Other: 
“What, in action, breaks forth as essential violence is the surplus of being over the thought 
that claims to contain it, the marvel of the idea of infinity” (Levinas 1979: 27). Why? 
Because the last characterization of violence as ethical violence is the non-adequation par 
excellence. 
Finally, what we have in war is the context or moment in which violence manifests 
itself more powerfully. It is manifest in all of the thee ways mentioned above. The un-
ethical aspect is pretty obvious, why the ethical as well then? The ethical aspect appears 
as a lack. The concentration camps are a good example to illustrate this point. In the 
context of horror and despair certain attitudes of fraternity among the victims appears as 
well as a moment of reflection about the ethical and the human that Levinas experienced 
himself. Levinas’s focus on war plays the role of showing that with the violence of war 
we gain consciousness of the sense and fragility of ethics. War becomes a moment of 
ethical reflection. Certain situations and relations with others appear in a way that could 
never happen on our daily basis and that are crucial for our understanding of ethics. 
3. The Link Between Ontology and War 
Levinas wants to show a fundamental bond between war and ontology. There is a 
parallelism between the determination of being in ontology and the determination of 
reality in war. War subordinates everything to the violence of its events. War determines 
reality (being), in a way in which everything is interrupted and forced out of its place to 
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violently play a new role in a new state of affairs. War becomes a totality that subordinates 
the other aspects of life in the most radical way. Levinas straightforwardly claims in his 
preface: “We do not need obscure fragments of Heraclitus to prove that being reveals 
itself as war to philosophical thought” (Levinas 1979: 21). Before introducing the main 
terminology that he is going to use in this book, he wants to call our attention on this link 
between war and being and how philosophy thinks on the basis of this link. 
Far from being obvious, the main philosophy that exploits this bond is the 
philosophy of Hegel6. Levinas situates himself against Hegel here. The difference that we 
find between Levinas on one side, and Hegel on the other, is that war is not 
philosophically relevant because of its role in the progress and understanding of being in 
history, but because of the loss of morality, autonomy, individuality, freedom and so. In 
Hegel, being is understood or determined through the absolute spirit. The development 
of the spirit is the development of a rational history directed towards an end. The crucial 
stages in which the spirit is embodied or that suppose a decisive direction in its progress 
towards the end of history are mostly moments of war and conflict. Thus, war is crucial 
in the development of being. Hegel is, because of this, considered the maximum exponent 
of the traditional philosophical rationality as totalization by Levinas. What Levinas brings 
to criticize Hegel’s philosophy that links being to war, is the idea of war as a totality in 
which all the individuals who suffer it are reduced to the catastrophe.  
So, what Levinas wants to stress is that, in war, the need of morality, the need of 
the ethical appears stronger than in our everyday life. It is in the moment of war when we 
know that our freedom is always in danger, that autonomy and morality are in danger. 
Morality appears in war times as an illusion. The institutions, that are supposed to 
maintain our moral duties fall, and our lives are reduced to the extreme violence that hits 
our lives as the most imminent reality: “at the very moment of its fulguration when the 
drapings of illusion burn war is produced as the pure experience of pure being” (Levinas 
1979: 21). This is the basic idea behind Levinas claiming that freedom consists in 
knowing that our freedom (and here we can include, autonomy and thus, morality) is in 
danger (Levinas 1979: 35), and that “to philosophize is to trace freedom back to what lies 
before it” (Levinas 1979: 84). This trace back means something like tracing back its 
                                                             
6 Here I obviously mean Hegel as it is interpreted by Levinas. Maybe this interpretation is unfair, but that 
is a whole other issue. Here I present in a general and summarized way the interpretation that Levinas has 
and that he is presupposing in TI. 
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unsuspected principles. We take freedom for granted as one of the most fundamental 
things because in our daily basis we live within morality and institutions that guarantee 
freedom, but war shows how this freedom can be in danger7, that it can be lost. Our 
freedom is built upon our relationship with others8. 
Thus war, as we said before, constitutes a totality because the individuals who 
participate in it and the elements of their lives become meaningful only by taking into 
account the ends of war. Sacrificed for the formation of a new being, of a new state of 
affairs, the justification of which through the process of war determines the sense of 
everything else. The imposition of politics and power over morality.  The totality that 
appears in war (for the reasons explained above that clarify the link between war and 
being), is a reflection of the ontological totality that operates in the core of traditional 
philosophical reasoning. Ontology subordinates the fundamental difference between 
individuals, their intersubjectivity, to a common being that reduces the particularity of 
each of those individuals to the neutral intersubjective corpus. In this corpus, the 
primordial relationship between subjects could be reduced to social sciences, for example. 
The individual then is just a type, an instantiation of a certain ontology, but this treatment 
destroys the primordial human face to face relationship that is for Levinas the basis of all 
experience. 
4. A New Understanding of Ethics 
The sudden and unexpected introduction of otherness in sameness is what Levinas 
calls ethics (Levinas 1979: 43). Levinas presents a new understanding of ethics. Instead 
of a systematic effort devoted to clarifying what is good and bad, ethics has to do 
(following the phenomenological fashion) with experience: “if experience precisely 
means a relation with the absolutely other, that is, with what always overflows thought, 
the relation with infinity accomplishes experience in the fullest sense of the word” 
(Levinas 1979: 25). As we said before, the face to face relationship is the basis of 
experience. This is the key idea of Levinas’s philosophy. Ontology, philosophical truth, 
language as wanting to say something, morality etc., all of them depend on the previous 
face to face encounter with another. I do philosophy because I need to respond to someone 
                                                             
7 This tracing back has more connotations. It also means that freedom on its own is not enough to understand 
ethics. Freedom must be determined and based in my relationship with others to be worth. But this issue 
would take us further. 
8 Contrary to some existentialist philosophies of that time which say that human being is condemned to 
freedom (See Sartre 1946). 
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else, I need to give reasons to someone else. The realm of being or truth on its own, a 
solipsist consciousness or a transcendental ego are worthless if they do not satisfy the 
responsibility that I have towards the Other. This fundamental responsibility is the engine 
of everything else in philosophy, this is why in Levinas, ethics is called first philosophy 
instead of ontology. 
  Levinas situates ethics as first philosophy in opposition to ontology following 
Aristotle’s formulation. In Levinas’s view this overcomes the traditional distinction 
between theory and practice because ethics was conceived by tradition as practical 
philosophy. First, we had to understand the theory to act in accordance afterwards. So, 
there was a hierarchy that situated theory above practice. By situating ethics as first 
philosophy the traditional hierarchy is overcome (Levinas 1979: 29). We do not need to 
understand the essence of the Other or the theory to the Other to approach it. Instead, it is 
that, thanks to the approach to the Other, we should start formulating the question of 
being. Similarly, the question about good does not need to be subordinated to the question 
about the being of good (what is good?). 
So, as this relationship between Same and Other breaks any adequation, it always 
leaves a surplus of being which cannot be said in the language of the Same, a surplus that 
is the central issue of this work9. So, we cannot use the traditional language of 
metaphysics or ontology to talk about this surplus. And it is in this challenge against 








                                                             




Derrida’s Deconstructive Reading of Levinas: “Violence and 
Metaphysics” 
 First, I must clarify that “Violence and Metaphysics” is not an attack on Levinas. 
Derrida himself explains that: “We will attempt to ask several questions. If they succeed 
in approaching the heart of this explication, they will be nothing less than objections, but 
rather the questions put to us by Levinas” (Derrida 2005: 104). However, Derrida’s 
reading is indeed a deconstructive reading of Levinas. The difference is simple: Derrida 
is not presenting Levinas’s philosophy as a philosophical position and then, from the 
outside, he attacks it and gives us his alternative position in response. Very differently, 
Derrida is commenting Levinas as truthfully as possible and then raises problematic 
questions that appear during the reading of Levinas’s work itself, from within, with his 
own terms and ideas. Deconstructive reading must involve this double gesture in which 
first I read the text as rigorously as possible, and then, a series of antinomies appear from 
within this reading (Critchley 2014: 23-27). Besides, those antinomies open up new 
questions and possible unsuspected readings of the text. 
 The central issue of “Violence and Metaphysics” is the possibility of questioning 
philosophy from within philosophy, or (in a more aggressive way) getting rid of 
philosophy from within. Levinas wants to denounce traditional philosophy10 but, in his 
attempt to denounce it, he is using its language, and while doing so, he accepts implicit 
premises that the language of traditional metaphysics intrinsically carries in its 
terminology. Derrida says straightforwardly that he is going to treat questions about 
language and the question of language (Derrida 2005: 136). 
As a preliminary remark, we should say that Levinas’s philosophy is, in its effort 
to be anti-ontological, a philosophy that is never going to define or present purely what it 
is talking about; it is a philosophy that works only by suggesting its ideas through a very 
metaphorical language and negation. Derrida explains it this way: 
It could doubtless be shown that it is in the nature of Levinas’s writing, at its decisive 
moments, to move along these cracks, masterfully progressing by negations, and by negation 
against negation. Its proper route is not that of an “either this… or that,” but of a “neither this… 
                                                             
10 I am using traditional philosophy and Greek philosophy as the same in accordance with Levinas. Levinas 
accepts, in a Heideggerian way, that philosophy is essentially and traditionally Greek. 
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nor that.” The poetic force of metaphor is often the trace of this rejected alternative, this wounding 
of language. Through it, in its opening, experience itself is silently revealed. (Derrida 2005: 112) 
It is also described as: “the infinite insistence of waves on a beach: return and 
repetition” (Derrida 2005: 398). Insistence that haunts the question again and again 
without never completely delimiting it. 
 Levinas’s attack against philosophical tradition includes, and is specially focused 
on, an attack against phenomenology: the philosophy of both Husserl and Heidegger. 
Levinas criticizes them, but at the same time, accepts phenomenological terminology. He 
wants to overcome certain phenomenological themes but when he is using 
phenomenological language, Levinas cannot avoid carrying the presuppositions that he 
wants to avoid. How can he get rid of the language that he is presupposing and accepting 
beforehand? 
 To illustrate this last point a little better: Derrida talks about the logic of 
“inheriting” in his essay “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences”. He explains how ethnography cannot avoid the discourse of the European 
science that it tries to attack. The ethnologist wants to develop a discourse outside of the 
traditional Western ethnocentric anthropology in order to criticize this ethnocentrism. But 
such a thing is impossible because when the ethnologist is attacking Western tradition, he 
is doing it from within the discourse and terminology that he has inherited from Western 
tradition. The use and acceptance of this language carries implicit premises with it: “The 
ethnologist accepts into his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment 
when he denounces them […] This necessity is irreducible; it is not a historical 
contingency” (Derrida 2005: 356). 
Going back to the main point, Levinas’s work is an attempt to overcome 
philosophical language in philosophical tradition to express a new notion of ethics as the 
relationship between subjectivity and otherness without totality. I will focus mainly on 
two problems: the first problem concerns the question whether Levinas can escape the 
traditional philosophical conceptuality. By “traditional conceptuality,” I mean the 
language of the whole of Western metaphysics starting from classical Greek philosophy 
all the way up to phenomenology. Now, what would it really mean if it is the case, as 
Derrida suggests, that Levinas cannot escape the traditional conceptuality of philosophy? 
And the second problem is that, in Derrida’s view, the language of Husserl and Heidegger 
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is even better to reach the goals of Levinas’s philosophy precisely because they are more 
aware of their use of traditional language with its ups and downs. 
1. Escaping from Greece: The Metaphors of Light and Space 
 As we saw in the previous chapter, Levinas wants to develop a philosophy against 
ontology. But the difficulty of this project lies in the fact that philosophical language itself 
is traditionally an ontological language, a language about being. It is not just that the 
language of philosophy is rooted in Greek language, but that philosophical language 
carries its ontological heritage in its Greek terminology. That means that when we are 
using Greek terminology, we are carrying certain ontological commitments with it 
(Derrida 2005: 100). 
 In Levinas’s thought we see how the Greek source of philosophy has some sort of 
a triangular understanding that involves, being, theory, and light. Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 8) 
situated theory as the highest human activity, and Plato (Phd. 247d) considered it the 
essential activity of the soul in the realm of forms. Theory is essentially linked to seeing, 
since etymologically it gains its meaning from the Greek θεωρός which basically means 
“witnessing a spectacle” (Nightingale 2004: 4). The θεωρός, in the context of ancient 
Greece, was basically an ambassador who visited a foreign city to witness some sort of a 
festival, before theory gained any intellectual or metaphysical meaning: 
In the traditional practice of theoria, an individual (called the theoros) made a journey or 
pilgrimage abroad for the purpose of witnessing certain events and spectacles. In the classical 
period, theoria took the form of pilgrimages to oracles and religious festivals. In many cases, the 
theoros was sent by his city as an official ambassador: this “civic” theoros journeyed to an 
oracular center or festival, viewed the events and spectacles there, and returned home with an 
official eyewitness report. (Nightingale 2004: 3) 
 It is, then, only after Plato and Aristotle that θεωρία gained its intellectual and 
metaphysical meaning. The metaphors of light or the literary use of light in philosophical 
tradition is justified because of this prevalence of the seeing11 over other senses; light, as 
that which brings clarity, that which helps us to see. Finally, the verb that dominates all 
theory is the verb “to be.” In theorizing we try to grasp the essence or the being of that 
                                                             
11 In (Taylor 2006) you can find a study about the role of vision and ethics in Derrida and Levinas. 
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which we theorize about. Clarifying or seeing something amounts to knowing what the 
being of this thing is12. 
Now I am going to explain how Derrida finds a metaphor in the “face”, one of the 
central terms of Levinas’s philosophy, that gains its meaning from the traditional 
metaphor of light. First, we will see how the face is linked to light, and then how Levinas 
also wants to avoid understanding “exteriority” as a spatial metaphor, but it becomes a 
really hard, if not an impossible, task. 
The same controversy appears with other terms such as “nudity” (Levinas 1979: 
74), for example. The use of metaphors in Levinas’s discourse aims to be absolved from 
their metaphorical character once the idea that they want to express beyond language is 
successfully suggested: “The word nudity thus destroys itself after serving to indicate 
something beyond itself. An entire reading and interrogation of Totality and Infinity could 
be developed around this affirmation” (Derrida 2005: 132). 
“The face” is a recurrent term in Levinas’s philosophy. It is described as the 
entrance and welcoming of the Other. However, Levinas says that it is an “epiphany”. 
Epiphany as επιφάνεια carries the idea of appearing or showing, and thus, bringing to 
light. Moreover, Levinas claims that this epiphany is an appearing that does not appear 
(Levinas 1985: 85). How is this possible? He tries to justify the manifestation of the Other 
while avoiding traditional seeing at the same time. 
Levinas claims that the face is not a metaphor (Levinas 1979: 207). The Other is 
not shown through it, that it is not the mediation of anything. The face itself is the 
appearing of the Other. But it is not a simple human face as we usually understand it. 
Nonetheless the epiphany of the Face is not able to abandon its condition of metaphor of 
light in Derrida’s view: “How, for example, will the metaphysics of the face as the 
epiphany of the other free itself of light?” (Derrida 2005: 114).  
Moreover, Levinas’s face is not just vulnerable from being a metaphor of light. 
Levinas claims that the Other expresses an exteriority more exterior than exteriority itself 
(Levinas 1979: 50): exteriority that is not a spatial metaphor anymore. He wants to avoid 
the traditional inside-outside opposition and metaphors to overcome traditional 
                                                             
12 Levinas’s rejection of light and theory leads him to an understanding of ethics refractory of being 
determined in concrete laws: that is what a traditional ethics would do; being prescriptive. Derrida calls it 
an ethics of ethics (Derrida 2005: 138). Levinas just philosophizes about the sense of ethics, but he is not 
proposing any moral to follow. 
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metaphysical language. However, in what sense is it legitimate to say that the Other is 
pure exteriority without metaphor? Levinas uses the concept of “exteriority” but an 
exteriority that would be beyond any spatial determination. A non-spatial relationship 
makes no sense, because relationship already presupposes space, and non-spatial 
relationship can only be indicated negatively. 
Inaccessible, the invisible is the most high. This expression […] tears apart, by the 
superlative excess, the spatial literality of the metaphor [...]But what necessity compels this 
inscription of language in space at the very moment when it exceeds space? And if the pole of 
metaphysical transcendence is a spatial non-height, what, in the last analysis, legitimates the 
expression of trans-ascendance, borrowed from Jean Wahl? The theme of the face perhaps will 
help us understand it. (Derrida 2005: 116) 
We should remember Derrida’s aim again at this point. He is not interested in 
saying that Levinas contradicts himself or that he is not coherent. He wants to point out 
the impossibility of getting rid of certain language while using it: “We are not denouncing, 
here, an incoherence of language or a contradiction in the system. We are wondering 
about the meaning of a necessity: the necessity of lodging oneself within traditional 
conceptuality in order to destroy it.” (Derrida 2005: 139). 
Another problem concerns onto-theology. As we said above, Levinas’s face is not 
simply a human face, but is neither the face of God, but rather the similarity between man 
and God. Levinas wants to reinterpret this traditional similarity without “participation”, 
because participation would involve totality: the two elements related by similarity would 
participate in a total, higher common essence. Levinas uses the idea of trace. The face is 
the trace of God, and a trace involves the appearing of something that is absent. The trace 
indicated that something was at some place at some point, but now is not there anymore. 
It has left us just a trace. The trace always points further. 
If we follow Derrida, Levinas would be, in a certain sense, still making onto-
theology. Even if God is not understood as a supreme being, it carries certain 
metaphysical implications and it works as the center of his philosophical discourse. A 
“center” as Derrida explains in “Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences”, is a concept that organizes and orients the other elements and concepts of a 
given philosophical discourse. Those other elements receive its sense in relation to this 
center, but the center, is, in a sense, outside of the system; it does not receive its sense 
from any other element (Derrida 2005: 352). Levinas, in the same way, situates God and 
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the Other outside of philosophical discourse but, at the same time, they need to be inside 
of it as the ultimate source of meaning if he wants to carry on with his philosophical 
discourse. But still, even if Levinas’s philosophy follows “the form of negative theology” 
(Derrida 2005: 132), there is a significant difference: Levinas does not eliminate 
language. Derrida claims that traditionally negative theology was characterized by a 
devaluation of language: Language cannot express the ultimate reality of God, so we have 
to approach it negatively and then we get rid of language once we are done. Negative 
theology values the capacity of intuition over language (Derrida 2005: 144). But this is 
not Levinas’s philosophy. Levinas wants to make justice with language. Indicate the 
violence in language with the same language that causes this violence. But, is it possible 
to have a non-violent language if language is already situated in the realm of the Same? 
(Derrida 2005: 145). 
Besides that, Derrida finds something attractive in Levinas’s idea of “trace”, but 
he turns this idea upside-down. In opposition, Derrida says that the dialogue between the 
Same and the Other happens not in the trace of God, but instead that God would be a 
product of the trace as well (Derrida 2005: 135). God would be an illegitimate 
substantiation of the trace. In Derrida’s view, Levinas does not need this substantiation 
and it would make his point easier if he avoided it. 
In summary: firstly, Levinas wants to escape the language of traditional 
philosophy because it is too theoretical to develop a new understanding of ethics. 
Secondly, some of Levinas terms as the “face”, “exteriority” or “God” cannot avoid 
carrying with them metaphysical and traditional implications. Thirdly, the idea of “trace” 
without the substantiation of God is more attractive to Derrida. 
1.1. Phenomenology as Traditional/ Greek Philosophy 
Now, the philosophical language that Levinas uses is the language of 
phenomenology, and again, there is a rejection of phenomenology as Greek philosophy 
that is done from within: Levinas rejects phenomenology while using it and by using it 
he is accepting its ontological commitments. We have, firstly, that phenomenology is the 
philosophy that Levinas recognizes many times as its own (Levinas 1979: 28), but at the 
same time he is always trying to overcome it. And secondly, a critique of both of his 
masters: Husserl and Heidegger. Both of them are too Greek in Levinas’s view. Husserl 
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for being mainly theoretical13, and Heidegger for not giving up the idea of philosophy 
mainly as ontology and Greek. But, in Derrida’s view, the language of both Husserl and 
Heidegger is even better to achieve Levinas’s own philosophical goals.  
1.1.1. Husserl 
Husserl’s philosophical project is strictly modern and epistemological, by which 
I mean that it is still trapped in the subject-object schema. He wanted to develop 
philosophy as a rigorous science with the development of phenomenology. 
Phenomenology is focused on the constitution of things as operations of a subjective 
consciousness, the sense-giving operations of consciousness. This means that the Other 
and the world had to be reduced to the operations of consciousness and treated as objects 
for a subject. Besides, Levinas would agree with others such as Ricoeur in the idea that 
Husserl’s philosophy is also focused in perception and mainly in a “philosophy of seeing” 
(Ricoeur 1967: 18). 
Derrida indicates that in TI Levinas seems to understand phenomenology as a 
methodology (Derrida 2005: 147), and asks: is it possible to get rid of this methodology 
as if it were a mere tool? Something that Levinas in his early works had denied. What we 
mean by tool here is that, in IT, Levinas seems to say that phenomenological language is 
the best at hand to express what he needs to say (Levinas 1979: 28), but as it is a Greek 
language, we should abandon it in the end, similar to Wittgenstein “throwing away the 
ladder” in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1961: 89). But the naiveté 
here lies in the fact that what we want to express is inseparable from the language in 
which it is expressed. Thus, Levinas cannot avoid phenomenology. 
What Levinas preserves more from traditional phenomenology is the idea of 
intentionality, which is reinterpreted beyond the noesis-noema distinction according to 
Derrida (Derrida 2005: 147). This means that the Other is not a moment of my 
consciousness. I do not reduce the Other to the structure of intentionality as the correlation 
between noesis and noema in consciousness. In Levinas’s new understanding of 
intentionality I am the pointed- intended by the face of the Other, and in the moment of 
pointing-accusation, a dialogue is established. The phenomenological “to the things 
                                                             
13 In the sense specified above. 
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themselves” in Levinas is read as a non-mediated dialogue with God. A dialogue that 
happens in the encounter with the Other’s face14. 
Derrida defends Husserl because, in his view, Husserl’s phenomenology already 
denies the distinction between practical and theoretical philosophy: ethics is not deduced 
from phenomenology. But ethics needs phenomenology to gain any sense, to express 
itself as its medium (Derrida 2005: 152-153). Derrida’s point is basically, that only in the 
language of being can we build a discourse about the Other. However, notwithstanding 
what we have just pointed out, in Derrida’s view, phenomenology is defective in its 
treatment of the non-present, because it is, from its very roots, a philosophy of presence 
(Derrida 2005: 167). 
 How does Derrida conciliate here the non-being subordinated by theory by using 
the language of being to express ethics? Derrida says that there are two meanings of 
objectivity: 1) objectivity as determination, the one that bothers Levinas, and 2) 
objectivity as sense. If ethics has any sense, this means that we can build any discourse 
around it and make it sufficiently understandable for any other reader. Then we have a 
theory of ethics. Any ethical sense presupposes noematicity in general, but this never 
implies a real/factual relationship or dependence between ethics and phenomenology 
(Derrida 2005: 152). If we would completely deny noematicity, this will lead us to negate 
conceptuality. 
1.1.2. Heidegger 
Heidegger introduces his own understanding of phenomenology going back to its 
Greek root, as the composition of φαινόμενον and λόγος. Φαινόμενον is derived from the 
verb φαίνεσθαι that means to show itself. At the same time φαίνεσθαι is derived from 
φαινω that means “to bring to the light of day”, the steam φα- as in φῶς (light) denotes 
manifestation, to make something visible, to clarify etc. The phenomena are, thus, what 
they show themselves as and what can be brought to light. And Heidegger equalizes it to 
the term τὰ ὄντα, the entities. But φαινόμενον has in Greek also the sense of appearance, 
something that seems like (Heidegger 1962: 52). 
Heidegger reinterprets phenomenology as “fundamental ontology”. Levinas 
rejects this reinterpretation because it favors ontology over ethics. Levinas claims in TI 
                                                             




that ontology subordinates our relationship with existents, entities, to the comprehension 
of the being of those entities. Heidegger’s philosophy is an accomplice of this 
subordination (Levinas 1979: 45). 
  However, Derrida defends Heidegger, firstly, because being, as it is used by 
Levinas, is not what Heidegger meant by it. Levinas confuses being with a concept, 
predicate, or even with an ἀρχή in TI, which would be true when criticizing traditional 
metaphysics, but not regarding Heidegger. It is precisely Heidegger who denounces the 
confusion between being and ἀρχή throughout the history of philosophy, and in this sense, 
Levinas’s critique of ontology is very similar to Heidegger’s critique of traditional 
metaphysics and the forgetting about the question of being (Derrida 2005: 177).  
But in Derrida’s view (and, secondly), Heidegger’s criticism to humanism applies 
to Levinas’s philosophy as well because of Levinas’s focus on the similarity between God 
and mankind described as a substance, a thing in itself, that appears in the face (Derrida 
2005: 178). Heidegger’s question of being does not mean the substitution of God for 
being or vice versa. The face can only appear thanks to the “letting be”, a Heideggerian 
notion that consist in the respect for the other’s being, only possible if I accept the 
language of being, and the difference between being and entity (Derrida 2005: 179). The 
difference between being and entity, contrary to what Levinas thinks, does not entail any 
oppression or constraint of any kind of being upon the entity. The distinction between 
being and entity is not a relation of any kind, but they are, in fact, inseparable. 
Thirdly, Derrida claims that with Heidegger’s distinction between being and 
entity, it is precisely the Being which permits the difference between Same and Other and 
not the opposite. Being is trans-categorical as the Other in Levinas (Derrida 2005: 175). 
Being in Heidegger must not be confused with a supreme entity or a special region of 
being. The ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας15 thus, must mean beyond the totality of existents or being 
understood as “what there is”, but not beyond being in the Heideggerian sense.  
                                                             
15 ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας: Beyond being. It makes reference to the idea of good beyond being that appears in 
the Republic. At the same time, Levinas connects Plato with Descartes. In the third meditation, Descartes 
conceives the idea of infinite as that which is in me, but it cannot possibly had been originated in me because 
it exceeds my capacity. It exceeds the realm of immanence in a way Husserl did not pay enough attention: 
“An absolute outside, an exteriority infinitely overflowing the monad of the ego cogito. Here again, 
Descartes against Husserl, the Descartes of the Third Meditation allegedly misconstrued by Husserl” 




Therefore, Derrida defends Heidegger’s language and philosophy as better 
prepared to face a criticism of the history of metaphysics than Levinas’s language. 
Basically, it is because Heidegger embraces the use of being in philosophy with its 
consequences instead of wanting to get rid of it as Levinas’s seems to try to achieve. 
In summary: Firstly, Levinas cannot avoid the metaphysical presuppositions of 
phenomenology because he is using phenomenological language. Secondly, he preserves 
mostly the Husserlian idea of intentionality in a novel and less theoretical way. Thirdly, 
in Derrida’s view, Levinas’s critique to Husserl and Heidegger is unfair, and the language 
of both is even more attractive to achieve the goals of Levinas’s philosophy than the one 
Levinas is using himself in TI. 
 2. The Other as Infinite 
 Going back to the metaphor of exteriority. As it was said before, Levinas says that 
the Other is more exterior than exteriority itself; an exteriority that should be beyond 
spatial determinations (Levinas 1979: 50). This exteriority is infinite. This attribution 
raises a series of questions: how can the Other as infinite, as non-spatial, enter into a 
relationship with the Same, with subjectivity? Any encounter or relationship needs a 
spatial point to happen, to make it possible (Derrida 2005: 140). But would this point of 
encounter become, then, a mediator that makes impossible the asymmetry that Levinas 
demands? But what does this asymmetry carry with it if the Other is completely different 
from subjectivity? 
 First, Derrida suspects that the attributions of the adjectives “finite” and “infinite” 
are not justified enough. Totality is always presupposed as finite totality in Levinas’s 
discourse, but this is not obvious at all (Derrida 2005: 133). In Hegel’s philosophy, we 
find subjectivity as an infinite totality. If we completely accept Levinas philosophy, 
totality should always be a closed system. But if we also accept that subjectivity develops 
itself in totalization, as Hegel does (and Levinas seems to agree with), then totality cannot 
be completely closed because the development of subjectivity always depends on its 
contact and confrontation with the world and with what this subject is not in the 
beginning. If we accept a closed totality, we are forced to accept a hermetic subjectivity 
as well, but Levinas rejects such a thing (Derrida 2005: 148-149). 
  If subjectivity is not completely enclosed, if the operations of my consciousness 
are not completely identical with what there is, the possibility of encountering the Other 
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makes more sense. Something may enter into, or be in contact with, a solipsistic ego only 
if this ego is open and incapable of grasping the totality of reality. However, if the Other 
is pure transcendence, pure exteriority, how does the ego find it? The Other needs to lose 
the exteriority to enter into a relationship with the ego. But where should we find the point 
of contact or encounter between Same and Other, finitude and infinitude? The dangerous 
aspect of this is that this point of encounter can easily transform Levinas asymmetry into 
a symmetry. Because the point of encounter could work as a neutral mediatory concept. 
Following Derrida, if sameness is not static, if there is economy and joy in the Same, and 
if the ego is not a solipsistic one but an open one able to find something outside of itself, 
there must be a constitution of the Same by a self-negation produced by an encounter with 
another. But this could lead to the confusion of otherness and alterity (Derrida 2005: 158). 
 The infinite exteriority of the Other would make any contact impossible due to the 
rejection of any space, and this affects the face as well: how can the face have any 
corporality? Besides, the only possible solution to maintain this infinite positivity of the 
face would be a certain dualism in which we would have to distinguish between the 
mundane face (the face of alterity) and a non-mundane one (the face of the infinite Other) 
(Derrida 2005: 143). 
 The confusion of otherness and alterity threatens the asymmetrical16 status of the 
relationship between Same and Other beyond totality. Levinas needs to maintain this 
asymmetry to break with Hegelian approaches to alterity because in Hegel’s philosophy 
the Other is just a moment of subjectivity; what appears to my consciousness is not-me 
or different from me but understood on the basis of me of my consciousness. In order to 
avoid this formulation, Levinas proposes a new metaphysics as desire towards the Other 
beyond being. Desire appears as a movement towards the Other in an anti-Hegelian 
fashion (Levinas 1979: 34). This movement establishes a principle of asymmetry by 
which the Other cannot be determined on the basis of any characteristics of the Same. 
Radicalizing the idea of otherness, Levinas wants to avoid in this way any symmetry as a 
possible means of assimilation. 
 This asymmetry carries with it important differences between Same and Other that 
can have serious consequences: what if the Other in its difference is not an alter ego? 
Levinas identifies the Same with the I and the Other with an infinite Other. But he does 
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not confer the characterization of alter-ego on the Other. This would be a mistake in 
Derrida’s view because I should be recognized as Other by my other. Egoity maintains 
the independence of the Other with respect to me. Kierkegaard’s egoity17 is not the 
empirical ego, but subjectivity in general and Levinas does not want to give up the idea 
of subjectivity (Derrida 2005: 159). 
 Husserl’s philosophy is in Derrida’s view a better and already achieved 
overcoming of Hegelianism. Moreover, it already had the sense of asymmetry that 
Levinas needs, and the characterization of the Other as an alter ego that Derrida believes 
fundamental (Derrida 2005: 149).  
The Other is in Hegel the non-defined negativity of the spirit. But Levinas does 
not want to situate the Other as negativity of the Same. In Husserl, the irreducibility of 
consciousness as intentionality cannot be reabsorbed as self-consciousness, it cannot 
become absolute knowledge. This means that consciousness for Husserl can never be self-
consciousness as it is for Hegel. In Husserl the experience of the object as it is perceived 
for me never apprehends the object itself, for the object is always exterior, other to me. I 
only work with it as given and presented in a certain way. Hegel does not respect this 
exteriority; in Hegel adequation and symmetry are perfect, the I and the non-I, subject 
and object are a moment in the development of the spirit as self-knowledge There is no 
reality beyond subjectivity and consciousness. In Husserl there is always a surplus in the 
noematic which transcends. This transcendence is already situated in immanence makes 
the goal of adequation impossible (Derrida 2005: 150). In this non-adequation Husserl 
maintains the respect, the distance with the Other. This surplus involves that the dative 
dimension (to whom I speak) must not be confused with the accusative dimension (what 
I am talking about). Levinas philosophy is about talking to the Other in opposition to 
theorizing about the Other.  
 Derrida’s defense of Husserl against Levinas works this way: what Husserl 
presents in his Cartesian Meditations is the Other as it appears in the sphere of the ego. 
But: A) Husserl never claimed straightforwardly that the Other could be reduced to the 
sphere of the ego. He always respected the realm of otherness of the Other (Serafini 2016: 
483). I do not have access to the “what” of the Other. The Other is just present as the 
                                                             
17 Kierkegaard’s subjectivity would be a good alternative against Hegel, but Levinas was not happy with it 
because he considered it (fairly or unfairly) not enough focused in the Other. 
24 
 
“who” that I am talking to. But the only possible theory that I can make about the Other 
is this one: to talk about the phenomenality (what is given to me) of the non-phenomenal 
(the Other). Besides, B) the idea of analogical appresentation does not involve an access 
to the Other. There is otherness also in things according to Husserl, but the otherness of 
things lies in the impossibility of encountering the object absolutely because of the limits 
of my perception. The Other subject is not just non-completely-graspable because of my 
perceptual limits, but because I cannot access its subjective experience. And, C) Husserl’s 
empathy does not involve that the Other is a moment or modification of my subjectivity. 
Alter-ego means that the Other has the form of an ego, and not that this “alter” depends 
on my ego (“alter” in not an epithet of the ego). If that were not the case, there would not 
be a recognition of violence towards anyone. Violence would have no victim and no 
author as well (because the Other has to recognize me too). Levinas’s ethical asymmetry 
must depend on this first symmetry that recognizes Same and Other as egos (Derrida 
2005: 160). 
3. The Violence of Language to Denounce Violence 
 Now, regarding the question: What would it mean if Levinas cannot avoid 
traditional philosophical language? First, I must remind the reader at this point that 
Levinas wants to avoid traditional philosophical language because this language fails in 
expressing the sense of ethics that Levinas wants to express, and furthermore, that this 
language is intrinsically violent because it is intrinsically ontological. Then, following 
Derrida, the impossibility of avoiding traditional language would mean that we can only 
denounce the violence in metaphysical language using metaphysical language, with the 
difficulties that it entails (Derrida 2005: 146). The main difficulty this subchapter will 
focus is about the impossibility of getting rid of violence in language. 
In his essay, Derrida gets to a point where he claims that if Levinas is in search of 
a pure ethical language without violence, then his goal is unreachable. When Levinas 
accepts philosophy and phenomenology he is carrying its ontological implications and 
their violence as well. The confrontation of metaphysics with more metaphysics turns 
into what Derrida calls the economy of light against light (Derrida 2005: 146).   
But Derrida does not only want to indicate this necessity in language. He goes 
even further. In his view, God and peace presuppose War. This means that only because 
of the fact that there is violence in war we need peace. Only in the moment of violence 
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the necessity of going back to the face of the Other becomes imperative. The dualism 
ethics-violence is what makes ethics intelligible (Derrida 2005: 184). An absolute respect 
for the face (pure ethics without violence) as well as a complete disrespect for it (pure 
violence without ethics) would lead to the non-intelligibility of violence. There is 
violence because there is face. The face is what offers itself to violence. 
 However, a different question could arise as well: if a non-metaphysical approach 
to ethics is impossible, why should not we remain in silence? If metaphysics carries an 
inherent violence with it, why do we not end metaphysical discourse? (Derrida 2005: 
185). Derrida believes that peace as the absolute absence of language would lead to the 
greatest violence, the total silence which would lead us to the absolute naught, and 
therefore, again, ethics would not have any place. The only possibility is to do less 
possible violence with language. Again, to put violence against violence. 
 In summary: 1) Levinas tries to criticize philosophy using philosophical language. 
And if he uses philosophical language, he is carrying with it the presuppositions that he 
would like to avoid. At the same time 2) he is criticizing the language of phenomenology, 
but it seems that phenomenological language is better prepared to achieve the goals of his 
project. Thirdly, 3) if there must be an asymmetrical relationship between Same and Other 
how can this relationship take place (the Other seems to be an infinite Other)? And finally, 
4) Does Levinas philosophy end in a philosophy of silence? If philosophical language 












Levinas’s Response to Derrida: Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 
 This chapter is going to take a look at Levinas’s second major philosophical work 
OB. I am going to consider Levinas’s later philosophical development on the basis of this 
work. Now that we have already exposed Derrida’s objections in our previous chapter, 
let’s see how it affected Levinas later philosophical development. OB can be read as a 
response to Derrida (Herrero Hernández 2005: 15). However, this does not mean that OB 
is merely a response to “Violence and Metaphysics”. Our point here is that some of the 
objections or problems that Derrida presents in “Violence and Metaphysics” should be 
now reconsidered to take into account the changes in Levinas’s philosophy. We are taking 
OB because it represents Levinas’s later philosophy at its best, but our conclusions should 
apply to the whole of Levinas’s later development18. 
We were facing a problem in language: how can we attack philosophy if 
philosophical language is the only possible language that we have to do it? How, if when 
using philosophical language, are we reintroducing the presuppositions that we want to 
avoid? Levinas wants to present a new understanding of ethics that would be beyond the 
scope of traditional philosophical language, but how can we talk about what is beyond 
the scope of philosophical language if we need this same philosophical language to 
express it? This question affected Levinas’s thought, and later in OB we find a deeper 
concern on this issue (Critchley 2014: 12). 
 However, if we think that the new direction that Levinas will take after “Violence 
and Metaphysics” is going to be more moderate, we are wrong. Levinas does not 
moderate his language, he gets more heterodox and poetical instead. Besides he mixes 
Judaism with philosophy more than ever before. But the point is that he raises the question 
about the possibility of betraying philosophical language from within. Levinas’s answer 
consists in saying that it is the duty of philosophical language to criticize the primacy of 
ontology even if it requires the use of ontology at the same time (Levinas 1998: 7). 
 In this chapter I will firstly focus on this possibility of criticizing ontology and 
then I am going to move to Levinas’s new proposal regarding subjectivity. The first issue 
will include: 1) the fundamental distinction between the Saying and the Said, 2) the 
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relationship between Greek and Hebrew aspects of Levinas, 3) a new consideration 
regarding Husserl’s phenomenology that will reinterpret Levinas’s project towards 
phenomenology again, and finally 4) a response to the problems regarding violence and 
language as we presented at the end of the last chapter. All of these subchapters or 
secondary points are basically responding to the idea of doing philosophy against 
traditional philosophy. The second issue is going to basically respond to the difficulties 
presented before by Derrida regarding the possibility of an infinite Other and its 
relationship with the Same. 
1. Otherwise than Being: The possibility of philosophy against philosophy 
 Levinas accepts that the only possible way of philosophizing is by using the 
language of being: “All research and all philosophy go back to ontology” (Levinas 1998: 
24). The reflection that we find throughout the whole work (OB) about the language of 
philosophy insists in this idea. So, Levinas acknowledges the impossibility of abandoning 
the language of being. The impossibility of abandoning ontology carries with it, at the 
same time, the recognition and respect for the history of philosophy and its classics. So, 
even if TI indicated the desire of a departure or break from tradition, this departure should 
not be understood as a denial of philosophical tradition at all. Levinas expresses this idea 
in this way: 
Philosophy thus arouses a drama between philosophers […]; empirically it is realized as 
the history of philosophy in which new interlocutors always enter who have to restate, but in 
which the former ones take up the floor to answer in the interpretations they arouse, and in which, 
nonetheless, despite this lack of "certainty in one's movements" or because of it, no one is allowed 
a relaxation of attention or a lack of strictness. (Levinas 1998: 20) 
 However, Levinas insists in the fact that his philosophical goal needs to introduce 
new terminology or reinterpret traditional terminology in a novel way to express his new 
understanding of ethics. But that does not mean to deny traditional philosophy, its status 
and its authority. Levinas claims it in this way: 
How can such a research be undertaken without introducing some barbarisms in the 
language of philosophy? Yet philosophy has, at its highest, exceptional, hours stated the beyond 
of being and the one distinct from being, but mainly remained at home in saying being, that is, 
inwardness to being. (Levinas 1998: 178) 
We can even claim from this quote that, according to Levinas, the idea of “beyond 
being” has been present in some “exceptional” moments in the history of philosophy. The 
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idea of “beyond being” has been an already a latent idea in the history of philosophy that 
demands our attention. 
Finally, it is not just that being is the only language at hand but that being carries 
in itself the possibility of its disruption. The idea of “beyond essence” does not mean to 
abandon ontology once and for all, not even a place outside of ontology. Ontology itself 
in its language brings the possibility of its own critique. This last point is what Levinas 
wants to develop by introducing the new distinction between the Saying and the Said. 
1.1. The Saying and the Said 
 Levinas introduces for the first time in OB a distinction between the Saying and 
the Said. The Said is the thematization, the language of ontology already determined by 
a system from which any given, or particular, Said is given a particular meaning. The 
Saying, on the other hand, precedes the Said and it is what makes it enunciable. That is, 
the very possibility of language before its thematization.  
Anything that has meaning, that can be elucidated by saying that it “is”, like in the 
form x is p19. Something, that becomes present by any kind of ontology, is already part 
of the Said; the Said is something, it means something; it is determined, constituted. It 
makes sense in relation with other elements of a given system in which it has been 
included. When things are clear and communicable, they belong to the sphere of the Said. 
The Said is the phenomenon of phenomenology that appears to consciousness as well. 
The distinction between Saying and Said is by no means separable (Waldenfels 
2005: 88). These are two sides of the same coin. However, the Saying includes the Said 
because, the Saying gives the Said the property of being removable and open to new 
contexts and interpretations. A good example of this is found in the biblical exegesis. 
According to Levinas, the Said that is established by a certain interpreter does not exhaust 
the whole meaning of the interpreted verse, and the Saying of the verse is the capacity 
that it has for being constantly renovated by new interpretations and discussions. Levinas 
says for example: 
Scripture as writing involves a call to posterity. Exegesis would be the possibility for 
one epoch to have a meaning for another epoch. In this sense, history is not something that 
relativizes the truth of meaning. The distance that separates the text from the reader is the space 
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(Ricoeur et al., 2004). 
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in which the very evolution of the spirit is lodged. Only this distance allows meaning to mean 
fully, and to be renewed. In the light of exegesis, then, one may speak of continuous Revelation, 
as one speaks in theology and philosophy of continuous Creation. (Levinas 1994: 170) 
The continuous renovation of the letter cannot be exhausted by any Said, but the 
renovation, the new interpretation as another one is a new Said. The Said on its own, 
without Saying, would be like a language preestablished forever outside of time and space 
that would leave no room for any possible modifications or changes. Only because the 
Said has the property of being renovated by the Saying language is flexible and open to 
new significations. So, when we say that the Saying precedes the Said, we mean precisely 
this. 
However, apart from these linguistic considerations, the priority of the Saying in 
Levinas bears the sense of encountering another. Language must be saying something to 
someone else, to respond. The way we are living in the world with others is understood 
by Levinas as a constant responding, unavoidable responsibility. Here is where Levinas 
situates ethics as the essential feature of language. It is actually not even a feature: 
language is basically ethics. This constant responsibility that we find in Saying, is what 
Levinas calls: “Saying as being exposed to another” (Levinas 1998). Another who is not 
me and to whom I respond. Following this line of reasoning, in Levinas’s view, any 
philosophical discourse should presuppose a reply to someone who is absent in the 
philosophical discourse.  
Furthermore, this Saying cannot be translated in terms of being in the language of 
ontology, because ontology as thematization depends upon the Saying. There is a surplus 
of Saying that is non-graspable by any thematization. The Saying has the surplus of the 
infinite, a surplus of absence that can never be completely expressed by any Said, it is 
never completely put into words, any thematization, any appearing: “Philosophy 
underestimates the extent of the negation in this ‘not appearing’, which exceeds the 
logical scope of negation and affirmation” (Levinas 1998: 168). However, this does not 
mean that philosophical discourse cannot indirectly, in a forced way, express the idea of 
the Saying. Even further, Levinas claims that in the Said the Saying can find the potential 
to renovate itself. This renovation would produce new Said. Philosophy can only be Said. 
But in the Said, the philosopher must try to philosophize about the idea of the Saying, 
and, thus, the philosopher needs to express it as much as possible. 
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 Now, we are back to Derrida’s problem: is it possible to explain this idea of 
“beyond essence”, that means not reducible to consciousness, in ontological language? 
As it is expressed by Levinas: 
A methodological problem arises here, whether the pre-original element of saying (the 
anarchical, the non-original, as we designate it) can be led to betray itself by showing itself in a 
theme (if an an-archeology is possible), and whether this betrayal can be reduced; whether one 
can at the same time know and free the known of the marks which thematization leaves on it by 
subordinating it to ontology. (Levinas 1998: 7) 
 By the very fact of formulating statements, is not the universality of the thematized, that is, 
of being, confirmed by the project of the present discussion, which ventures to question this 
universality? Does this discourse remain then coherent and philosophical? These are familiar 
objections! (Levinas 1998: 155) 
 In order to answer, Levinas stablishes a simile between his own philosophy and 
skepticism. The skeptic who by saying that “nothing is true” is pretending to say 
something true. The skeptic falls, like Levinas, prey to the language that he wants to 
denounce (the language of truth and knowledge) every time that he is presupposing it to 
express the idea that “actually nothing is true”. But Levinas’s point is that regardless of 
the paradox, philosophy is obligated to fight skepticism in a never-ending fight because 
in skepticism we face a problem inherent to philosophical language, and the fact that it 
has been a major problem, proves its moment of truth: 
 Philosophy is not separable from skepticism, which follows it like a shadow it drives off by 
refuting it again at once on its footsteps. Does not the last word belong to philosophy? Yes, in a 
certain sense, since for Western philosophy the saying is exhausted in things said. But skepticism 
in fact makes a difference, and puts an interval between saying and the said. Skepticism is 
refutable, but it returns. (Levinas 1998: 168) 
 As “philosophy is not separable from skepticism” ontology should not be 
separable from its own critique as well. Then, Levinas even goes further and says that the 
history of Western philosophy, which has been many times read or interpreted as the 
refutation of skepticism, is actually better interpreted as “the refutation of transcendence”: 
 The history of Western philosophy has not been the refutation of skepticism as much as the 
refutation of transcendence. The logos said has the last word dominating all meaning, the word 
of the end, the very possibility of the ultimate and the result. Nothing can interrupt it. Every 
contestation and interruption of this power of discourse is at once related and invested by 
discourse. (Levinas 1998: 169) 
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 Because skepticism is already a theoretical question, that means, ontological in 
the end, and with it we already presuppose the primacy of being and its λόγος. Philosophy 
has always reduced everything to the λόγος of being. This has been explained enough in 
the present study. 
1.2. Hebrew and Greek 
 This problem helps us in clarifying what Levinas’s philosophical project is about. 
It is not just a question of language, but a question of how we interpret the history of 
Western philosophy, when we say that the tradition has been a Greek philosophical 
tradition. 
 This specific issue does not concern OB as much as it does with other texts written 
by Levinas that would work better as a source, but it is accepted that the way Levinas 
changes and even radicalizes his language in OB is in huge part because of his growing 
interest in the Hebrew textual tradition, especially the Talmud (Herrero Hernandez 2005: 
16). 
Levinas’s idea would not be to find a third term in between Hebrew and Greek, 
like this “Jewgreek” (Derrida 2005: 192), but to elucidate the relationship between those 
two and denounce a certain interpretation of tradition that legitimates the Greek aspect 
over the Jew. Levinas prefers a fruitful dialogue between Hebrew and Greek. But it would 
not be exactly a dialogue because they are not at the same level and conditions. Greek is 
already accepted and legitimized as the language of philosophy, while the Hebrew needs 
to be vindicated, renovated and reintroduced in philosophy. But the point is that this 
relationship between the Hebrew and the Greek must not end in a synthesis or 
“assimilation” that is actually what Levinas wants to avoid and would denounce as 
totalization. 
It has been a question if what Levinas wants to do is to translate Hebrew into 
Greek20, but the idea of translating here is very problematic because of what we have just 
mentioned: if translation involves some sort of assimilation or synthesis, then it must be 
avoided. Besides, it is not just about expressing Hebrew in Greek terms. Instead, the point 
                                                             
20 We find this expression in the English introduction to Nine Talmudic Readings by Annette Aronowicz 
from 1990 (Levinas 1990).  
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is that by expressing and introducing Hebrew in Greek, Greek must be modified and 
questioned. 
Levinas’s new understanding of ethics as the questioning of sameness by 
otherness is read in this issue as if Greek was the philosophy of sameness and Hebrew 
was the Other. The way the Jew is alien to Europe is the way traditional philosophy wants 
to subordinate the non-Western into its same language or conceptuality. Under the idea 
of universalism and truth, western civilization justifies herself to be legitimated enough 
to “assimilate” the non-Western. “Levinas believed that the pursuit of assimilation by the 
dominant culture had a philosophical source in the Greek conception of truth” 
(Bernasconi 2014: 262). 
Actually, the interpretation of tradition as Greek is not so old, and it has been part 
of ani-Semitism during the 19th and 20th centuries in Europe: “it has only been in the last 
200 years or so that philosophers have identified their discipline as Greek and thereby 
sought to locate Judaism outside an exclusively Greek philosophical tradition” 
(Bernasconi 2014: 265). A certain reading of tradition involves a certain reading of 
Europe and that worries Levinas for obvious historical reasons (the Holocaust). If the 
interpretation of traditional philosophy had consequences with Nazism and the Holocaust 
(as Levinas affirms), then a criticism of philosophical tradition and its language is needed. 
In conclusion, Levinas’s problem is the questioning of tradition that can be read 
as the questioning of European ethnocentrism. However, the vindication of the Hebrew 
is not a vindication of the alien to criticize European culture, as if Levinas wanted to 
change two cultures in opposition. It is about reinterpreting and reviewing the way 
philosophical tradition has been understood until the Holocaust21. 
1.3. Reinterpretation of Husserl’s Reduction 
 Now I want to point out that in OB Levinas goes back to Husserl in a novel way. 
The point is that Levinas reinterprets Husserlian reduction. But now instead of consisting 
in the parenthesizing of the natural attitude that should take us to pure consciousness, it 
is interpreted as taking a step back, precisely before consciousness, to capture the idea of 
the Saying. Only executing this reduction, we can take a step back and understand the 
                                                             
21 In (Moyn 2003) you can find a good account of Levinas’s reception of Jewish tradition and how he uses 
this tradition to rethink and reinterpret the concept of tradition itself. 
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importance of the Saying over the Said: “The movement back to the saying is the 
phenomenological reduction. In it the indescribable is described” (Levinas 1998: 53). 
 Here Levinas is defending that his reduction is his philosophical activity or 
exercise. Levinas is writing a philosophical text about the Saying (something prior to 
consciousness and the Said), because he is in a sui generis sense parenthesizing the 
priority of consciousness and presence as the sources of all meaning. He justifies in this 
way his “treason”. It is a treason because, the Saying can never be completely presented 
or exposed as a Said. Levinas, in writing a philosophical work about the Saying seems to 
be committing this treason of talking about that which cannot be put into words. The 
treason that aims to defend that which is beyond the borders of philosophical language 
through philosophical language: “But is it necessary and is it possible that the saying on 
the hither side be thematized , that is, manifest itself, that it enter into a proposition and a 
book? It is necessary” (Levinas 1998: 43). Only the parenthesizing of consciousness 
makes it justifiable for me to talk about what is beyond consciousness. 
 Husserl is attacked for the reasons already mention in this study, but now, we see 
how Levinas vindicates his figure and philosophy by claiming that his project follows the 
logic of phenomenological reduction:  
Husserl will have taught us that the reduction of naivety immediately calls for new 
reductions, that the grace of intuition involves gratuitous ideas, and that, if philosophizing 
consists in assuring oneself of an absolute origin, the philosopher will have to efface the trace of 
his own footsteps and unendingly efface the traces of the effacing of the traces, in an interminable 
methodological movement staying where it is. (Levinas 1998: 20) 
 However, what follows from the above quotation is that pure consciousness and 
transcendental subjectivity are, in Levinas’s eyes, Husserl’s own naiveties that call to be 
reduced (Sebbah 2012: 77)22. 
The reduction presented by Levinas involves a phenomenology that, taken 
seriously to its limits, leads us to the acceptance of non-adequation and non-presence. 
The otherness that does not appear in the phenomena: “But the reduction is reduction of 
the said to the saying beyond the logos, beyond being and non-being, beyond essence, 
                                                             
22 In (Sebbah 2012) we find a good study about how some French philosophers (like Derrida, Levinas or 
Henry) by taking the principles of phenomenology to its limits end up overcoming phenomenology itself. 
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beyond true and non-true. It is the reduction to signification, to the one-for-the-other 
involved in responsibility” (Levinas 1998: 45, 142). 
1.4. Language and Violence 
 In OB Levinas accepted the encounter with the Other as ethical violence much 
more that he did in TI and he even uses a more violent vocabulary to talk about 
responsibility (Sebbah 2012: 209). However, I think that Derrida is not very fair regarding 
this point. I mean: Derrida was questioning if Levinas philosophy was in search of pure 
peace without violence (Derrida 2005: 133). But, in our first chapter I already presented 
how Levinas accepts a certain violence in ethics (Levinas 1979: 53).  
In OB the renovation of the Saying as the interruption of the Said means that when 
a dominant discourse (philosophical tradition here) is interrupted, the violence of this 
interruption counts as ethical violence: the violence caused by the sudden appearing of 
the Other in the Same: “The surprising saying which is a responsibility for another is 
against "the winds and tides" of being, is an interruption of essence, a disinterestedness 
imposed with a good violence” (Levinas 1998: 43). 
Levinas uses along his work the term “trauma” or “traumatic” to describe the 
demand that responsibility carries. So, responsibility would involve a certain unavoidable 
violence, but this violence is justified by the fact that it comes from responsibility itself. 
We are always responsible towards the Other, that cannot be qualified as good or bad in 
a traditional sense:  
The one affected by the other is an anarchic trauma, or an inspiration of the one by the 
other, and not a causality striking mechanically a matter subject to its energy, in this trauma the 
Good reabsorbs, or redeems, the violence of non-freedom. (Levinas 1998: 123) 
Levinas uses the term “Good” with capital letters to mean something previous to 
the common usage of “good”. He basically means that one is responsible before any 
value, any distinction between good and bad. Responsibility is not valuable in this same 
sense. Then Levinas says that the Good “redeems” the violence, but what it is meant is 
precisely that responsibility in itself is non-qualifiable. Only because there is infinite 
responsibility, I can value good and bad the way we usually do: “Responsibility is what 
first enables one to catch sight of and conceive of value” (Levinas 1998: 123). So, 
following this line of reasoning, the opposition peace-war, or good-bad is not solvable. 
The intangibility of one element needs the other, and that even reinforces much more the 
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idea of infinite ethical responsibility. If the opposition cannot be solvable the necessary 
presence of war makes the imperative of responsibility infinite or constant. 
Derrida’s concern is if Levinas’s attack against philosophical language (because 
of its inherent violence) could become a justification of silence, then it will end in a 
greater violence that has been already contested when we clarified the issues regarding 
language. But I wanted to go deeper into this point and show how the acceptance of 
violence in ethics and their necessary relationship is accepted by Levinas. 
2. A New Understanding of Subjectivity: The Trace of the Other in the Same 
 Let’s turn finally to the second big issue here: subjectivity. Regarding this issue, 
we saw in the previous chapter that Derrida’s problem was the description of the Other 
as an infinite Other. How can the Other as infinite, as non-spatial, enter into a relationship 
with the Same, with subjectivity? How can Levinas maintain an asymmetrical 
relationship while at the same time accept a point where Same and Other must be 
connected? How to justify a non-spatial relationship? 
 What in TI seems like an abyss between the Same and the Other in favor of the 
asymmetrical character of the relationship between Same and Other, is in OB saved. 
Levinas overcomes this abyss by directly introducing the Other in the Same. The Other 
and the Same are not two separate elements, they are only separable in our philosophical 
discourse. But the Other is already in subjectivity. There is no complete closed sphere of 
subjectivity and subjectivity is already growing, developing itself in otherness. There are 
two elements that help Levinas to justify this idea: substitution23 and the trace. 
 The first element is the reinterpretation of subjectivity in OB as “being subjected 
to”. Subjected to the Other is what Levinas calls “substitution”, which entails that I am 
always facing the Other and being responsible towards him. This unavoidable position 
towards the Other is described by Levinas as being a “hostage”. But substitution would 
add as well that I am not just responsible for the Other in the sense of being in front of it, 
being there for it, but at the same time that I am responsible of its actions as well. Levinas 
claims that subjectivity as being-a-hostage has the form of “the one-for-the-other”. With 
                                                             
23 R. Bernasconi has already outlined that substitution is a key idea that can be read in part as a response to 
Derrida (Bernasconi 2004: 249). 
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this form Levinas is not just introducing otherness in subjectivity, but at the same time, 
giving an ethical drive to it (Bernasconi 2004: 235). 
 Subjectivity as “the-one-for-the-other” instead of the traditional “for itself”, in 
Levinas means that self should never be approached as an abstraction. This is what 
traditional philosophy has done, focusing on the self as a universal subjectivity, 
completely separable from the Other (Bernasconi 2004: 241). Levinas presents the subject 
as the speaker, which is not separable from the speech24, a speech that is understood as 
always responding to someone else. That is why it is understood as infinite responsibility. 
Plus, it has an accusative form (instead of nominative). The subject is not the ego who 
originates meaning, it is the “here I am” accused (in the sense of being interpellated, 
interrogated, or questioned), by the Other instead (Bernasconi 2004: 244). 
 R. Bernasconi detects a crucial change from TI to OB regarding subjectivity, he 
claims that: “In Otherwise than Being the responsibility inherent in subjectivity is prior 
to my encounter with an other, whereas Totality and Infinity had located the possibility 
of ethics in the concrete encounter that realized the formal structure of transcendence” 
(Bernasconi 2004: 242). This means that in TI Levinas is presupposing subjectivity as a 
separated ego beforehand, and then he explains the relationship with the other as an 
encounter. In OB Levinas changes his strategy and situates the Other at beginning, the 
relationship is already established (Bernasconi 2004: 246). 
What we find in OB may be read as a less hermetical conception of subjectivity: 
“We have to conceive in such terms the de-substantiation of the subject, its de-reification, 
its disinterestedness, its subjection, its subjectivity” (Levinas 1998: 127). This “de-
substantiation” is what makes possible being affected by the Other. First in a radical 
passive way, that would come to express the radical subjection to the Other, and then, 
being affected in psychism, already involving the operations of consciousness. 
In the second section of TI we find Levinas’s analysis of subjectivity as self-
constitution, the analysis of economy, separation, joy and others. Self-constitution 
involves freedom. In OB Levinas’s picture of subjectivity is the one that determines 
freedom in its being determined by responsibility: “The self is the very fact of being 
exposed under the accusation that cannot be assumed, where the ego supports the others, 
unlike the certainty of the ego that rejoins itself in freedom” (Levinas 1998: 118). But, 
                                                             
24 But again, the speaker here is not the abstract “emitter” in linguistics (Waldenfels 2005: 90). 
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let’s be careful. This does not mean that the free subject and the analysis of TI are rejected. 
The point is that Levinas is developing and focusing on the idea of subject as passive 
subjection prior to freedom. In a single short paragraph Levinas summarizes his whole 
idea like this: 
Signification, the-one-for-the-other, the relationship with alterity, has been analyzed in 
the present work as proximity, proximity as responsibility for the other, and responsibility for the 
other as substitution. In its subjectivity, its very bearing as a separate substance, the subject was 
shown to be an expiation for another, the condition or unconditionality of being hostage. (Levinas 
1998: 184) 
 The second element is the trace. The trace of the Other, or the face, is what makes 
possible his appearing and not-appearing at the same time. Derrida already acknowledged 
this point, but he did not want to follow the idea of being a trace of God, because God 
would involve a substantialization of the trace. This objection is contested 
straightforwardly: “A face does not function in proximity as a sign of a hidden God who 
would impose the neighbor on me” (Levinas 1998: 94). Even if the face is presented as 
the trace of divinity this does not lead us to God as an ultimate source, or to say anything 
about God (to claim anything in the way theology as an ontological discourse would do). 
Levinas does not follow negative theology because he does not want to claim anything 
about God, not even negatively. The binary structure of affirmation and negation would 
already belong to the language of being, and God in Levinas cannot be approached in this 
language, not even negatively (Levinas 1998: 162). 
Regarding Derrida’s defense of Husserl’s language in the 5th meditation. To 
recognize the Other as alter-ego is just one aspect of the question of otherness. Levinas’s 
question of otherness is not just about the other human. Derrida is right in defending 
Husserl by saying that Husserl leaves the otherness of the alter-ego untouched, unreduced, 
and that it is a misreading to say that Husserl reduces the alter-ego to an operation of my 
consciousness. However, if the Other is just an alter-ego Levinas philosophy would not 
be able to justify the priority of responsibility before consciousness because the character 
of egoity and of subjectivity would be already presupposed. Levinas wants to prioritize 
the character of otherness before anything else. This entails a dehumanization of this 
otherness, in the sense that the Other as a philosophical category in Levinas philosophy 
would include the other human, but otherness is not just the other human. The other 
human is included in otherness, but otherness includes the other culture, the other 
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language, the other kind, and so on. It is true that Levinas’s work is focused specially in 
the other human, but the Other is not always meant as the other human, and his philosophy 
can be applied to further analyses of specific others. 
In summary: Levinas addresses Derrida’s problem regarding language 1) first 
presenting the idea of the Saying that would come to justify the possibility of 
philosophizing against philosophy even with a philosophical language. Secondly, 2) 
regarding Levinas’s position towards tradition, he re-situates and re-interprets his work 
as part of phenomenological tradition by following the Husserlian method even if this 
leads him to reject some principles of Husserl’s philosophy. Plus, the heterodox language 
that may be interpreted as a Hebrew turn is not abandoning Greek philosophy but 
reinterpreting tradition taking into account of the Other non-assimilable by the Greek 
tradition. Thirdly, 3) Levinas acknowledges the necessary opposition war-peace and his 
philosophy should not be interpreted as a philosophy of silence. And finally, 4) Levinas 
















Levinas’s Saying and Derrida’s Writing 
What I am going to do in this last chapter is, in order to close the circle, a final 
comparison between Levinas and Derrida to show how they are actually closer to each 
other than it may seem. Notice that there are two moments in Derrida’s philosophy: an 
earlier Derrida that is more focused on deconstruction, and a second one that is more 
ethical and political. In this later Derrida, the influence of Levinas’s philosophy is more 
obvious (Serafini 2016: 482), but I am not going to talk about it. I am only considering 
“Violence and Metaphysics” because the influence of Derrida’s earlier work in Levinas’s 
philosophy is not so obvious and discussed by scholars. 
I need to justify this comparison again. It is not just about similarities or 
disagreements. That would be pointless. The point is that we can consider both 
philosophers as philosophers against the metaphysics of presence and logocentrism. What 
I am going to do here is first to explain what logocentrism is and, how Derrida’s idea of 
writing criticizes logocentrism and its metaphysics of presence. Secondly, I am going to 
take Levinas’s idea of Saying and see if it undermines the metaphysics of presence. Let’s 
keep in mind that I am doing this comparison on the basis of “metaphysics of presence” 
and “logocentrism”. These are terms or ideas from Derrida, so we are taking him as the 
philosophical referee again. Here phenomenology would be criticized as well because 
according to Derrida phenomenology is the latest philosophical development of the 
metaphysics of presence (Derrida 1972: 13). 
Derrida says that logocentrism lies at the heart of occidental metaphysics. 
Logocentrism is the idea that writing is secondary and subordinated to speech. Speech 
seems immediate to our intuition, seems like I am completely aware of what I am saying 
and that I have a control over it. That the meaning of what I am saying and what I want 
to say is present to my consciousness in the moment or context in which it is said. The 
voice carries with it a “phonetic substance” that reinforces the idea of being present, 
appearing to me, to my consciousness in the present moment, creating an illusion of 
immediacy. The voice is, in this sense, linked to the idea of consciousness as presence 
(Derrida 1972: 32). In logocentrism, the prevalence of presence aims to not let any 
“residue” outside the present totalization or context (Derrida 1988: 14). Or, as expressed 
by Derrida elsewhere: “conscious intention would at the very least have to be totally 
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present and immediately transparent to itself and to others, since it is a determining center 
[foyer] of context” (Derrida 1988: 18). 
These are the reasons why traditional metaphysics is fundamentally metaphysics 
of presence: being has been interpreted as being present, and truth as clear and pure 
appearance. It goes hand in hand with the idea that whenever something is missing, I can 
trace it back; that there is an ultimate source of meaning or sense. And this ultimate source 
has been traditionally conceived as being outside of any context in order for it to be pure; 
working as a fundamental center. Some examples of this center are: God, transcendental 
subjectivity, pure reason, structure, and so on. 
But Derrida’s idea is that there is no such thing as an ultimate source that would 
make possible this tracing back of our concepts to its original meaning. And in the same 
way, there is no possible way of telling how a certain context is determined, in the sense 
of saying where it begins and where it ends in order to have a clear unit of meaning 
presentable and separable from the elements absent that may determine any given context. 
For example, my present perception of a tree is always mediated by my native language, 
the other trees that I have perceived previously, if I know enough biology to look at it 
scientifically, or I look at it as a painter (for example), if it has any folkloristic relevance 
for me, and so on. A sign (as it may be the tree in our previous example) depends on its 
relation among, and with, other signs. This depends on its difference from those other 
signs as well (this tree is not that other tree, and it is not an animal, nor a tool, etc.). This 
differing makes impossible the pure presence of the meaning of any given sign. 
The present element depends on the non-present, creating a play of differences. 
This play or movement of differences is what Derrida calls writing or différance. 
Metaphysics has always wanted to isolate a layer of sense as pure sense outside of 
différance (Derrida 1972: 44). 
Derrida extends différance to experience as well. It is not just a linguistic question: 
“I shall even extend this law to all "experience" in general if it is conceded that there is 
no experience consisting of pure presence but only of chains of differential marks” 
(Derrida 1988: 10). Then, experience is not a purely present thing. Experience, if we take 
it as appearing to consciousness, cannot be a pure present appearing to consciousness and 
this includes self-presence as pure present subjectivity. In Derrida’s words: 
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What holds for consciousness also holds here for what is called subjective existence in 
general. Just as the category of subject is not and never has been conceivable without reference 
to presence as hypokeimenon or ousia, etc., so the subject as consciousness has never been able 
to be evinced otherwise than as self-presence. The privilege accorded to consciousness thus 
means a privilege accorded to the present. (Derrida 1973: 291) 
Subjectivity (and consciousness), as pure subjectivity cannot be isolated in this 
sense from différance, there is no self-presence and the subjective experience depends on 
the play of différance (Derrida 1972: 41). 
Traditionally, writing was conceived as a secondary representation of speech that 
was the vehicle to transmit thought and ideas (Derrida 1988: 4). Writing in Derrida does 
not have a center or a fundamental source of meaning that could be traced back. So, it is 
not the vehicle of a pure idea or thought. A text, as the written form, does not depend on 
anything pure or transcendental as an ultimate origin of its meaning, and it has the open 
possibility to be quoted, reproduced, and developed again and again. As it is explained: 
Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the current sense of this 
opposition), in a small or large unit, can be cited" put between quotation marks; in so doing it can 
break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is 
absolutely illimitable. This does not imply that the mark is valid outside of a context, but on the 
contrary that there are only contexts without any center or absolute anchoring. (Derrida 1988: 12) 
This means that the meaning of a given text is not determinable by any 
hermeneutical exercise. The reading of the text does not amount to a “decoding of a 
meaning or truth” (Derrida 1988: 21). Its meaning is not fully reducible to “a wanting to 
say”, an author or a context. It has the possibility of dissemination beyond any “wanting 
to say”. Writing is not exhausted by the transmission or exchange of what we want to say 
[vouloir-dire]. The exchange of “wanting to say” would involve conceiving 
communication just as the exchange of pure present ideas from one consciousness to 
another (Derrida 1988: 20).  
Dissemination is the property of being quotable. To take something written out of 
its context and find a new context for it. It is basically the plasticity and flexibility of 
language. Writing involves the possibility of overcoming any context as the hermeneutic 
horizon in which meaning as what encoder/speaker wants to convey is presented to 
consciousness. (Derrida 1988: 9). This is why Derrida says that “no context can entirely 
enclose it”. Dissemination carries with it “the always open possibility of its 
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disengagement and graft” (Derrida 1988: 9). And dissemination is sometimes described 
by Derrida as the spacing of the letter: “spacing as a disruption of presence in a mark, 
what I here call writing” (Derrida 1988: 19). 
Derrida presents a new concept of writing; however, it does not mean that he is 
inverting the traditional relation between speech and writing (Derrida 1972: 37). If that 
were the case, we would only be choosing one side of the traditional distinction speech-
writing and we would not be able to understand what traditional metaphysics is 
presupposing in this distinction. 
Now, turning to Levinas. Levinas understands ethics as a philosophy of 
experience, that for the first time is not going to take experience only in terms of presence. 
This critique of experience as presence goes hand in hand with a critique of consciousness 
as presence, like in Derrida’s case. Levinas would say that consciousness amounts to the 
synchronization of time that would come to reduce any experience to its representation. 
Levinas puts it this way:  
The temporalization of time, as it shows itself in the said […] synchronizing the signs, 
assembles into a presence, that is, represents, even the time of responsibility for the other. But it 
is not possible that responsibility for another devolve from a free commitment, that is, a present; 
it exceeds every actual or represented present. It is thus in a time without beginning. Its anarchy 
cannot be understood as a simple return from present to prior present, an extrapolation of presents 
according to a memorable time, that is, a time assemblable in a recollection of a representable 
representation. (Levinas 1998: 51) 
The synchronization of time makes possible the recollection and expectation of 
experience. In this way, experience would be knowledge by a consciousness that could 
trace it back and forth. And in this way, consciousness becomes self-presence and 
Levinas’s account of subjectivity would be precisely the opposite of this self-presence. 
Why? Because in his new understanding of subjectivity as substitution, responsibility is 
not an operation of consciousness, it does not depend on my freedom, nor on my 
representations: I can never be completely responsible because the imperative of 
responsibility can never become completely present. Moreover, we cannot trace back its 
origin: 
The responsibility for the other can not have begun in my commitment, in my decision. 
The unlimited responsibility in which I find myself comes from the hither side of my freedom, 
from a "prior to every memory," an "ulterior to every accomplishment," from the non-present par 
excellence, the non-original, the anarchical, prior to or beyond essence. The responsibility for the 
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other is the locus in which is situated the null-site of subjectivity, where the privilege of the 
question "Where?' no longer holds. (Levinas 1998: 10) 
The pre-originality of this anarchy that avoids the questions “what?” and 
“where?”, in the sense that it is not possible for us to trace back its source or origin, is the 
reason why Levinas’s Saying is described as “pre-original”. Precisely because he wants 
to avoid the transcendental or a priori connotations that “original” has. It is not the 
fundamental origin of meaning. Meaning in the Said depends on other Saids, as Levinas 
puts it: “In the said, to have a meaning is for an element to be in such a way as to turn 
into references to other elements, and for the others to be evoked by it” (Levinas 1998: 
69). In this sense the Said as the sign in Derrida, would come to depend on other elements 
that are not present in the moment of the Said. Thus, any Said cannot be completely 
present, and we cannot determine completely the context in which a Said means 
something. Levinas’s Saying has a similar, if not the same, dissemination that writing has 
for Derrida. The Saying as the constant renovation of the Said, implies the open 
possibility of new meanings and new interpretations. There is nothing such as a perfect 
or complete Said. Saying never amounts to communication as the exchange of ideas from 
one consciousness to another, precisely because meaning is not originated in 
consciousness: 
To say is to approach a neighbor, "dealing him signifyingness." This is not exhausted in 
"ascriptions of meaning," which are inscribed, as tales, in the said. Saying taken strictly is a 
"signifyingness dealt the other," prior to all objectification; it does not consist in giving signs. 
The "giving out of signs" would amount to a prior representation of these signs, as though 
speaking consisted in translating thoughts into words and consequently in having been first for-
oneself and at home with oneself, like a substantial consistency […] Saying is communication, 
to be sure, but as a condition for all communication, as exposure. Communication is not reducible 
to the phenomenon of truth and the manifestation of truth conceived as a combination of 
psychological elements: thought in an ego - will or intention to make this thought pass into 
another ego - message by a sign designating this thought - perception of the sign by another ego 
- deciphering of the sign. The elements of this mosaic are already in place in the antecedent 
exposure of the ego to the other, the non-indifference to another, which is not a simple "intention 
to address a message". (Levinas 1998: 48) 
 The pre-originality and anarchy of the Saying carry with them the impossibility 
of a pure synthesis in a pure present. The account of consciousness as it is presented in 
Husserl’s phenomenology is rejected in this sense. That leads us to accept that 
responsibility is not originated in consciousness but vice versa. 
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Levinas has different ideas about writing and writing in opposition to oral speech. 
A careful analysis of the development of his Talmudic readings and thesis about 
hermeneutics and exegesis would help us regarding this issue. However, that could be 
reserved for another study. The only thing I consider worth mentioning here is that: “one 
can read his reduction of phenomenological discourse as a displacement and reinscription 
of a classical understanding of writing” (Riera 2004: 27). 
In sum, both Levinas’s Saying and Derrida’s Writing challenge the philosophical 




















 Levinas philosophical project in Totality and Infinity attacks traditional 
philosophy because it has been too focused on ontology. Ontology, according to Levinas, 
carries with it an inherent violence that has been expressed in parallel in the history of 
Western civilization leading to the Holocaust. Levinas wants to present a new 
understanding of ethics as the relationship between subjectivity and otherness. However, 
Levinas wants to avoid traditional philosophical language because it appears as 
inadequate to capture this idea of otherness due to its too ontological approach. 
 Then, we have that Derrida deconstructs Levinas’s early philosophical project in 
his essay “Violence and Metaphysics” and raises this main question: How can Levinas 
attack traditional philosophy if when he is doing philosophy, by using philosophical 
language, this language carries the same ontological presuppositions and premises that 
Levinas tries to avoid. Levinas in his criticism of traditional philosophy includes 
phenomenology, the philosophy of both Husserl and Heidegger. Derrida argues that 
Levinas would succeed more regarding his philosophical goals if he accepted the 
language of Husserl and Heidegger because they seem to have a better approach towards 
philosophical tradition and that gives them an advantage to attack this tradition. 
According to Derrida, even if Levinas tries to avoid ontological language as much as 
possible he cannot avoid using certain metaphors that carry with them some ontological 
presuppositions. This problem rises questions such as: how can an infinite Other 
encounter subjectivity? and should we suspend philosophical speech if it is impossible to 
avoid the inherent violence that the ontological language carries with it? 
In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Levinas presents partly a response 
to Derrida’s criticism. It is a response because Levinas addresses the question of his own 
philosophical language for the first time. Levinas asks himself if it is possible to talk about 
the Other, what is beyond being, in terms of being. If it is licit to philosophize about that 
which exceeds philosophical language, if it is not a treason to its own project. He 
compares himself with skepticism in the sense that the contradiction inherent to skeptical 
philosophy (mainly claiming that there is no truth and trying to say something true at the 
same time), is similar to his effort of criticizing philosophy using philosophical language. 
The essential contradictions of both his project and skepticism present in any case major 
philosophical problems that must be traded. With some new notions, but specially the 
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notions of Saying, trace, and subjectivity as substitution; Levinas is able to justify his 
philosophical project and respond to Derrida’s critiques. 
In the end I have also added that Levinas’s notion of the Saying is in opposition 
with the idea of meaning and experience as fully graspable by a transcendental 
consciousness, and, in this sense, it supposes an agreement with Derrida’s notion of 
writing against what Derrida calls “metaphysics of presence”. Therefore, In Otherwise 
than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas is not just responding to Derrida but getting closer 
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Saying Beyond Phenomenology: Levinas’s Response to Derrida 
 
This thesis presents a study of Emmanuel Levinas’s Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence as a response to the main philosophical problems and criticism that 
Jacques Derrida presents to Emmanuel Levinas’s earlier philosophy in his essay 
“Violence and Metaphysics”. The main philosophical question is: How can Emmanuel 
Levinas criticize ontology while using ontological language if ontological language 
carries with it the ontological presuppositions that he wants to avoid? This same question 
is treated in a way that leads us to deal with other major philosophical topics, mainly: 
ethics, subjectivity and tradition. In the last chapter of this thesis I claim that Otherwise 
than Being or Beyond Essence makes it easier to present Emmanuel Levinas’s philosophy 
as a critique of “metaphysics of presence”, and thus much closer to Jacques Derrida than 
it may seem. 
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